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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 14-4665 
____________ 
 
CLAUDIA WINWARD, 
                                        Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from United States District Court  
for the District of Delaware 
(D. DE. No. 1-09-cv-00034) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sue L. Robinson 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 15, 2015 
 
Before:  FISHER, CHAGARES and JORDAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: November 10, 2015) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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FISHER, Circuit Judge 
  Claudia Winward appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment 
in favor of the Commissioner of Social Security affirming the Commissioner’s denial of 
Winward’s disability benefits. We will affirm. 
I. 
We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of the case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts that are necessary to 
our analysis. 
In April 2006, Winward applied for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits 
for the period of July 1, 2000, through March 31, 2003 (hereinafter “relevant time 
period”). Winward claimed that she suffered from depression and anxiety that limited her 
ability to work. Winward’s application was denied, so she requested a hearing before an 
administrative law judge (“ALJ”). 
 In order to determine whether Winward was disabled, the ALJ employed the 
Social Security Administration’s five-part test.1 Pertinent to this appeal, the ALJ 
                                              
1 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v). The five-step process requires the ALJ to 
review: 
 
(1) the claimant’s current work activity; (2) the medical severity and 
duration of the claimant’s impairments; (3) whether the claimant’s impairments 
meet or equal the requirements of an impairment listed in the regulations; (4) 
whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity to return to past relevant 
work; and (5) if the claimant cannot return to past relevant work, whether he or 
she can make an adjustment to other work in the national economy.  
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considered: treatment notes from the relevant time period from Dr. Zorach, Winward’s 
treating physician; a check-the-box questionnaire completed by Dr. Zorach in 2007—four 
years after the relevant time period ended; Winward’s own statements regarding her 
condition; and the opinions of two physicians, Dr. Simon and Dr. Abashidze, based on 
examinations conducted in 2009. The ALJ also employed a hypothetical question 
directed to a vocational expert in order to determine whether Winward had the residual 
functional capacity to perform jobs that exist in the national economy. 
Following the hearing, the ALJ found that Winward (1) is not currently engaged in 
substantial gainful activity; (2) has severe impairments due to depression; (3) does not 
have a medical impairment that meets or is the medical equivalent of the listed 
impairments; (4) does not have the residual functional capacity to perform past relevant 
work; and (5) has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary to light work in 
jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. Thus, because she failed 
the final step, the ALJ concluded that Winward was not disabled and denied her 
application. Winward requested review of the ALJ’s decision, which the Appeals Council 
denied, making it the Commissioner’s final decision. 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 632, 634 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The claimaint bears the burden of proof at steps one through four; at step 
five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. Id. 
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Winward sought review in the District Court, which granted the Commissioner’s 
motion for summary judgment, holding that the ALJ’s findings were supported by 
substantial evidence. Winward timely appealed. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the 
Commissioner’s legal conclusions and review the Commissioner’s factual findings for 
substantial evidence, which is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 
as adequate to support a conclusion.”2 In reviewing the evidence, we may not weigh the 
evidence or substitute our own view for that of the Commissioner.3 
III. 
Winward presents two arguments on appeal: (1) the ALJ did not afford the proper 
weight to her treating physician’s opinion; and (2) the ALJ’s hypothetical question to the 
vocational expert did not reflect all of Winward’s impairments. 
1. 
 Winward first contends that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial 
evidence because the ALJ improperly weighed the opinions of Winward’s physicians. 
Specifically, she argues that the ALJ should have afforded controlling weight to her 
                                              
2 Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting 
Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
3 Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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treating physician, Dr. Zorach, and no weight to Dr. Simon, who observed Winward in 
2009. 
 Where a treating physician’s opinion is “well-supported by medically acceptable 
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other 
substantial evidence in [the record],” it will be given “controlling weight.”4 When 
presented with conflicting evidence, the ALJ “may choose whom to credit but ‘cannot 
reject evidence for no reason or for the wrong reason.’”5 An ALJ “may afford a treating 
physician’s opinion more or less weight depending upon the extent to which supporting 
explanations are provided.”6 
The ALJ did not give controlling weight to Dr. Zorach’s opinion, as expressed in 
the questionnaire, because it was “not well supported by medical signs and laboratory 
findings and [was] inconsistent with his detailed treatment records.”7 As the ALJ 
explained, Dr. Zorach’s questionnaire conflicts, not only with the opinions of other 
experts, but also with his own opinion as expressed in his treatment notes from the 
relevant time period. These notes documented that Winward “performed some household 
chores and was working part-time as a floral designer and planning to start her own 
                                              
4 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 43 (3d Cir. 
2001).  
5 Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Mason v. Shalala, 
994 F.2d 1058, 1066 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
6 Id. 
7 App. at 12. 
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business.”8  Dr. Zorach’s notes also reported that she experienced mild to moderate 
restrictions with respect to activities of daily living and her concentration, persistence, 
and pace and that Winward’s condition was improving, as her depression and anxiety 
lessened with treatment. 
In addition to Dr. Zorach’s notes from the relevant time period, Dr. Zorach’s 
questionnaire was also inconsistent with the evidence in the record. The ALJ considered 
the opinion of Dr. Simon, who personally examined Winward, and Winward’s own 
statements regarding her abilities. Dr. Simon opined that Winward was “capable of 
managing benefits, making decisions, adapting to different circumstances … as well as 
exercising judgment, insight, and common sense.”9 These conclusions were based, in 
part, on Winward’s own statements to Dr. Simon that she was able to perform chores, 
cook, and maintain relationships with others. Because Dr. Zorach’s questionnaire 
conflicts with Winward’s own statements, Dr. Simon’s conclusions, and Dr. Zorach’s 
treatment notes from the relevant time period, the ALJ was not required to give it 
controlling weight. The ALJ reasonably relied on the medical evidence in the record as a 
whole to determine that Winward was not disabled. Therefore, we conclude that the ALJ 
did not err in concluding that Dr. Zorach’s questionnaire is not entitled to controlling 
weight.  
2. 
                                              
8 App. at 9. 
9 App. at 12. 
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 Winward next argues that the ALJ’s hypothetical question to the vocational expert 
did not sufficiently include all of Winward’s limitations. The vocational expert’s answer 
to the hypothetical question provided a partial basis for the ALJ’s determination that 
Winward had the residual functional capacity to perform a range of sedentary to light 
unskilled work for which there were a significant number of jobs in the national 
economy. 
“[A] vocational expert or specialist may offer expert opinion testimony in 
response to a hypothetical question about whether a person with the physical and mental 
limitations imposed by the claimant’s medical impairment(s) can meet the demands of 
the claimant’s previous work.”10 The ALJ must accurately convey to the vocational 
expert all of the claimant’s established limitations, but “[w]e do not require an ALJ to 
submit to the vocational expert every impairment alleged by a claimant.”11 Rather, the 
ALJ must convey only those impairments that are “medically established.”12 A 
hypothetical question that encompasses every credible limitation established by the 
record may be relied upon as substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion that 
an individual is not disabled.13  
Although Winward claims that the hypothetical question omitted limitations in her 
social functioning and her ability to maintain a routine work schedule, those limitations 
                                              
10 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(2). 
11 Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 554 (emphasis in original). 
12 Smith, 631 F.3d at 634 (quoting Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 554). 
13 Plummer, 186 F.3d at 431. 
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were not supported by the record. They were found only in Dr. Zorach’s questionnaire 
opinion, and as explained above, the ALJ did not afford controlling weight to his opinion 
as stated in the questionnaire because it conflicted with his own treatment notes and the 
medical record as a whole. Because the limitations that Winward alleges should have 
been included in the hypothetical question were not “medically established,” the ALJ was 
not required to include them in the hypothetical question. And because the hypothetical 
question set forth every credible limitation established by the record, it can be relied upon 
as substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion that Winward is not disabled. 
We therefore conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings and 
that the ALJ’s hypothetical to the vocational expert conveyed all of Winward’s medically 
established limitations.  
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.  
